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Jeffrey Steele is a British Artist who works within the constructivist and
post-constructivist tradition. In Europe that tradition has its roots in, and is
sustained by, groups of artists including, Art Concret, Zero, de Stijl, Russian
Constructivism, Structuur, and other twentieth century avant-garde move-
ments concerned with the physical structure of the work as content. It
thereby rejects depictive content as superfluous to that structure. Nor are
these groups attracted to expressionism as an alternative content. Rather,
they assume the autonomy of the work and deny or suppress the egocentric
position of the artist. Certainly, for Steele, the idea of the artist as an excit-
ing and excited wanderer, outside of society and, through his genius, able to
provide us with unique perspectives upon our condition, is to romanticise the
artist and to marginalise him even as he is lauded. Not all artists insanely
cut off their ears and grant us a vision of their loneliness.
In 1966 Steele took part in The Responsive Eye at New York’s Museum
of Modern Art. The international show also exhibited works by Josef Albers,
Ben Cunningham, Larry Poons, Frank Stella, Ad Reinhardt, Bridget Riley
and Victor Vasarely. Steele spent three weeks in New York, staying at the
Chelsea Hotel, and he met and spoke with many of the city’s artists and
theorists. It was during this period that he visited Andy Warhol at The
Factory where they discussed the nature and status of Warhol’s Brillo Boxes.
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Figure 1: Syntagma Sg IV 118, 2005, Oil on flax canvas, 146 x 146 cm. Copyright
Jeffrey Steele, courtesy of Osborne Samuel.
The Responsive Eye was curated by William Seitz and a half-hour film of
the same title was made by Brian de Palma showing the works in the context
of the opening night, where Steele was interviewed along with other artists
together with a protracted interview with philosopher/psychologist, Rudolf
Arnheim.1 In that film, the architect Philip Johnson, at that time a collector
of both Bridget Riley and Jeffrey Steele, responded to a question regarding
Op Art: ‘No, I don’t call it “Op Art”, I think it’s perfectly ridiculous, I
bought a Bridget Riley long before it was Op Art—that was an invention by
American journalists.’ He goes on to say that the best title for this work is
the exhibition title. Otherwise how could you have Albers sitting alongside
work that relies for its effect upon moiré patterns. (Much if not most of the
work in the exhibition relied upon these patterns.)
Steele distanced himself from Op Art, not least because Op Art, as the
name suggests, relies upon optical illusion—and illusion is something that
concrete artists were decidedly against. Having rejected pictorial space as
illusionistic, the physical structure of the work was to present itself as the
object of attention. In an interview in the film, Steele states, ‘The logic is
important. The sensation is important, but only so in that it engages the
attention.’
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With the distance established between his work and Op Art, Steele pro-
ceeded with his wife, Anja Nenonen, to mount the Systeemi exhibition in
Helsinki in 1969. This in turn led to the formation of the British Systems
group of artists who worked together until the mid-seventies and who later
showed together informally. In the mid-seventies Steele was showing with
the Dutch avant-garde gallerist Reikje Swart in Amsterdam and with Lucy
Milton in London.
Regarding the artist as engaged with society, rather than peripheral to
it, Steele taught theory and practice of fine art. He was engaged in theory
and published in major fine art journals.2 In 1984 he was to contribute to
the International Workshop on the Theory of Art in Caracas, a meeting that
brought him into contact with philosophers, Arthur Danto, Stanley Cavell
and Stephen Toulmin.
I would like to add that I was a student of Jeffrey Steele in the mid-
seventies at both Portsmouth Polytechnic and at The Slade School of Fine
Art; and I am grateful for the manner in which he taught us and in which
he instilled in us a great respect for art and a sense that art really matters;
and that its theory engages with other disciplines in which we might better
conceptualise our practice. What follows are Steele’s thoughts on a range of
matters concerning the nature of his art in the wider context.
Edward Winters, London, May 2016
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Figure 2: Stanley Cavell, Jeffrey Steele, Luis Castro-Leiva, Caracas Workshop, 14th
December 1984. (Photo: Gloria Carnevali. Reproduced with permission.)
I. CONCEPTUALITY AND AESTHETICS
AN APPROACH TO A THEORY
By Jeffrey Steele
The thing to avoid, I don’t know why, is the spirit of system.
(Samuel Beckett).3
Here I shall have nothing to say about the technical aspects of my work as
a painter. But this work is not separate from the everyday Lebenswelt, as
some would have us believe, but is part of it. My opinion or ‘views’ about
my specialist assignment will, to be sure, be better informed than those of
my neighbour. But my discourse as ‘an artist personality in society’, if it
is to be effective, is not permitted to pull rank. It must survive all manner
of competitive encounters at the theoretical level if it is to be allowed to
continue.
This is the sense in which I claim that every artist, in order to be one,
must already have developed a competent sociological theory.
Konsequenz
The industry for authenticating works of art insists on having, for every object
offered for sale, a name, a date, and a provenance. Thus opening up a field
for a secondary industry in fraudulent attributions.
This is one reason why the establishment of reliable chronologies is im-
portant.
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But there is also a Proustian sense in which the antiquarian concept of
chronology is rearranged, so that the events of the wasted time are transposed
into a zone that is itself outside time. Proust reminds us several times that
his work is a construction.
In 1960 when I painted my first ‘hard edged’ geometric paintings, some
friends asked: ‘why are you painting pictures that belong in the 1930s?’
My newest painting, dated 2016, was already fully conceptualised (in the
limited sense advocated by Sol Le Witt) by the end of 1960, but did not rise
to the top of my preferential agenda for execution until quite recently.
Well into the 1920s Claude Monet was adding NEW practical and concep-
tual information to the quintessentially nineteenth century political history
and metaphysics of impressionist art, long after its cultural ‘impact’ seemed
to have been fully assimilated or even superseded.
In 1947 Thomas Mann publishedDoktor Faustus: Das Leben des deutschen
Tonsetzers Adrian Leverkühn, erzählt von einem Freunde.
In 1949 he published Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus. Roman eines
Romans.
Entstehung: a key concept.
Fictionalisation
We are asked to consider ‘Conceptual Art and its Legacy’. Alfred Jarry’s
Ubu was derived from his physics master at the Lycée de Rennes in 1888,
Monsieur Hébert.
‘Pere Ubu’ and ‘Ubu Roi’ could fairly be considered to be part of the
legacy of Monsieur Hébert.
But what about ‘Alfred Jarry’?
The worlds of art and of philosophy may or may not intersect, but, un-
doubtedly, both are intersected by a third and more powerful one, which is
the industry for popular entertainment, sport and show business.
Jarry made a cultural intervention of historic importance which has its
origin in a schoolboys’ prank, and, if we look closely there is a ‘clowning’ or
‘court jester’ element everywhere to be seen, going right back to the Greek
Sophists of the fifth century B.C.
René Descartes
Just as comedians are counselled not to let shame appear on their
foreheads, and so put on a mask: so likewise now that I am to
mount the stage of the world, where I have so far been a spectator,
I come forward in a mask. (René Descartes).4
‘I have spent the whole day shut up in a stove-heated room, (. . . )’5
Descartes’s Descartes identifies himself as a professional soldier aged twenty-
three at the time. (1618) It is not until part four in my edition that Descartes
comes to the ‘Cogito’ which he first approaches in a double negative form: ‘I
could not feign that I was not.’
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A genuine epistemological crisis seems to arise at this point. It is the
personage, and not the ‘real’ (?) Descartes who has been proved to exist.
Then there is a logical sense in which the writer’s existence is negated. At
the same time, (‘dans un seul et même movement’) Descartes demonstrates
his real belief in the existence of a reader—recipient of his idea.
Paul Cézanne
Central to my concern is the body of written work that has accumulated
around the conversations and letters of Paul Cézanne (1839—1906).
The critical year is that of Emile Zola’s novel L’Oeuvre, 1886.
Cézanne’s shock, and indeed his grief at this event, is well documented.
Zola’s personage, Claude Lantier, is taken as having been modelled on
Cézanne himself, but there is an irreconcilable abyss between these two con-
ceptualities, both as they apply to the ‘artist personality in society’ and, more
importantly, to the work programme of the artist in the context of a profes-
sional milieu, which includes that of the younger Claude Monet mentioned
above.
I suggest that it is in this ‘clash of conceptualities’ that the need for
subsequent art practices to incorporate a more self-consciously theoretical
element, first made itself felt.
I have claimed that Cézanne is an important epistemologist, but by this
I do not mean that he ‘epistemologises’ at the easel in the way that some
people have claimed that Beethoven ‘philosophises at the keyboard’.
In his book (see, infra) Daniel Herwitz calls Naum Gabo ‘Constructivism’s
Descartes’, and I do not mean that either.6
Rather, I refer to sentences such as the following quotations from Cézanne’s
letters to Emile Bernard: (23 Octobre 1905)
Or vieux, 70 ans environ, - les sensations colorants, qui donnent
la lumière sont chez moi cause d’abstractions (emphasis added)
qui ne me permettent pas de couvrir ma toile, ni de poursuivre
la délimitation des objets quand les points sont tenus, délicats,
d’ou il ressort que mon image ou tableau est incomplete. (Paul
Cézanne).7
And, (26. Mai 1904):
Le littérateur s’exprime avec des abstractions tandis que le peintre
concrète (emphasis added) au moyen du dessin et de la contour
ses sensations, ses perceptions. (Cézanne).8
Note that Cézanne uses the word ‘concrète’ as a verb: ‘concrèter’, as
innovatory and awkward in French as ‘the painter concretes’ would be in
English.
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There is a French verb ‘concrétiser’ but Cézanne seems deliberately to
have avoided using it.
Every word of sentences such as these is charged with philosophical mean-
ing, and these meanings do not translate readily from one language to another.
And so my claim is that Cézanne’s propositions deserve to be studied and
compared to those of Descartes and his commentators, which address the
same problematic.
I know that this ‘prise de position’ irritates many philosophers and I would
defend it not merely with reference to the literature which it has engendered
but, in the present context, as the point of emergence of the need for a self-
consciously elaborated category to be called ‘Conceptual Art’.
Cézanne’s promise: ‘Je vous dois la vérité en peinture et je vous le dirai’
is printed on the outside cover of my ‘Edition critique présentée par P. M.
Doran’, Macula, Paris, 1978.9
I am irritated in my turn when Jacques Derrida exploits the slogan on the
outside of the book, and instead devotes his own book of the same title to
diverting my attention to irrelevant matters.10
Reception
The best analysis of my work to date has not come from any source in art
history, art education or art criticism. It was written by a young student
of Linguistics, Sandra Hoffmann, under the supervision of her tutor Karina
Türr ‘in der Philosophischen Fakultät I (Philosophie, Geschichte und Sozial-
wissenschaffen) der Friedrich—Alexander Universität Erlangen—Nürnberg’,
in 1992.
It is not a doctoral dissertation but a Magisterarbeit, and it was well-
received, but Sandra told me that she had no intention of pursuing an aca-
demic career.
Two excerpts are relevant here:
REZEPTIONSMÖGLICHKEITEN Grundsäzlich läßt sich Steeles
Werk auf zwei Ebenen rezipieren, Visuel und Konzeptuel, wobei
sich diese beiden auch durchdringen können. (Sandra Hoffmann).11
And
Die Differenz, die Max Imdahl zwischen ‘veritas aesthetica’ und
‘veritas logica’ ansetzt, lehnt Steele ab. (Hoffmann, p. 61. Added
emphasis).12
Imdahl had written (this time I translate):
However many illuminating things may be said about an artwork—
the attempt to theorise art or the essence of art is like the attempt
to theorise the untheorisable. (Max Imdahl).
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Imdahl’s essay is called, ‘>Op<, >Pop< or the always coming to an end
History of Art’, and the book: Jauß 1968. Jauß is best known for his later
elaboration of an influential, but also contested theory of aesthetic reception.
My refusal of Imdahl’s proposition, restated positively, is the ‘core propo-
sition’ subtending my work as an artist. Put quite simply, it seems to me that
a clear process of abstract thinking should lead to a satisfying visual Gestalt.
In formulating this proposition two philosophers have helped me greatly:
The first is Max Bill, (1908—1994), particularly his essay, ‘Art as non-
changeable fact’.13 The other is Jean Piaget, (1896—1980), e.g., his assertion:
‘It is intellectually intolerable to admit that there exist two kinds of truth,
for logic requires their coordination.’14
Atteggiamento
In her very closely argued essay, Carolyn Wilde defines Conceptual Art:
Conceptual Art can be seen as one particular stance (added em-
phasis) within the tradition (of Fine Art), a stance (. . . ) particu-
larly related to its own times. (Carolyn Wilde).15
The word ‘stance’, chosen from amongst all its possible cognates—‘When
Attitudes Become Form’—suggests an heroic ‘prise de position’ against some
recalcitrant force.
Confrontational. . . 16
‘Stance’ is good because it marks a perfect intersection of synchrony and
diachrony.
Cézanne was fond of the word ‘Tempérament!’ In his usage it implies an
irreducible charge of competitive antagonism, without any lapse into destruc-
tive warfare.
Kriegszustand
In the first serious philosophical writings on art—perhaps the first
writings in which art is so much as recognised as such—a kind of
warfare between philosophy and art is declared.
When art internalises its own history (. . . ) it is perhaps unavoid-
able that it should then turn into philosophy at last. And when it
does so, well, in an important sense, art comes to an end. (Arthur
C. Danto).17
Arthur Danto is perhaps best known for his claim that, with Marcel
Duchamp the aesthetic drops out of the definition of art.
In his book entitled, Anywhere or Not at All, Peter Osborne, places
Danto’s contribution in the context of Postconceptual Art. Its second chapter
entitled, ‘Art beyond aesthetics’ is required reading here.18
For my part, and putting it very crudely, I find that the attempt to eman-
cipate art from its historic relationship to an aesthetics of beauty, so far from
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Figure 3: Syntagma SG III 104, 1992, Oil on linen, 61 x 61cm. Copyright Jeffrey
Steele, courtesy of Osborne Samuel.
yielding ‘an art without aesthetics’, leaves us merely with an art of miser-
able aesthetics, and so I find myself in disagreement with theorists such as
Osborne.
But much more urgently, I am moved to reject the diversionary violence
implicit in the following assertion by Stanley Cavell:
[I]t no more counts toward the success or failure of a work of art
that the artist intended something other than is there, than it
counts, when the referee is counting over a boxer, that the boxer
had intended to duck. (Stanley Cavell).19
Cavell’s suggestion, as with that of Danto, is that we are already on a war
footing, and we can see this in the photograph above.
But because of the neuroticised conditions of the conflict, it is very difficult
to identify the main issue which is at stake.
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Aside from masochism, there is a question about why I have wanted to
insist on presenting the photograph at the head of these notes, for it clearly
shows me being knocked out of the ring by the philosophical champion, Stan-
ley Cavell, at the Venezuela conference.
It stands as a case of attitudes becoming form.
A ‘conceptual attitude’ might, after all, be considered as another name
for an ideology.
Theorists of ideology, from Marx to Althusser, and via contributions from
Gramsci, Brecht, Benjamin, Adorno and others, have shown that ideologies
cannot easily be encapsulated in any stable propositional form, because they
are always, in Althusser’s sense, overdetermined.
A few moments before the photograph was taken everything had seemed
to be sweetness and light, and so I have been curious, ever since, about the
causes of the explosive situation that ensued. Such is the degree of attachment
(cathexis/Besetzung) that joins each participant to his or her assignment role
in the debate, that the mauvaise foi that Jean-Paul Sartre associated with
all such social role-playing is exposed, and an unpleasant animal substrate
comes into view.20
The exact location and the implications of the aesthetic referent, of aes-
thetic value, and of my personal likes and dislikes may seem to be matters of
marginal importance: ‘some people just don’t like strawberries’, ‘De gustibus
non est disputandum’ . . .
But
There is a real sense in which all philosophical—and indeed political—
problems ‘bottom out’ into problems of aesthetics.
Aesthetic referents are systematically used to justify the exercise of polit-
ical, and of course also military, power.
Given the state of ‘martial law’ decreed a priori in this case by Danto, it
was perhaps entirely necessary for me to lose this particular skirmish, con-
ducted about a concept of beauty espoused by Cavell and, for that matter,
by Clement Greenberg, about which I am sceptical.
I like to hold onto the hope that something resembling Friedrich Schiller’s
On The Aesthetic Education of Man might eventually prove to be both pos-
sible and practically feasible, but for this to happen certain tenets must be
regarded as critical objects for discussion: both rational and, in principle,
intelligible.21
Regarding the Caracas Conference itself, it has already prompted one
interesting book, mentioned above, and, given the time, I should one day like
to write another. Daniel Herwitz calls it ‘that magnificent event’, but I would
go a little further than that.22
In order to bring these notes to a conclusion I have found myself reliving
and reconstructing the events of that December morning in Caracas:
All of the participants were asked to prepare a paper for discussion, but I
am the only artist to have done so.
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I have not yet had time to through-read all of the other papers which have
been declared by our chairman, Stephen Toulmin, ‘taken as read.’
Nobody has.
Nor have I read Stanley Cavell’s book, Must We Mean What We Say?
(1969) in which he asks, ‘How can fraudulent art be exposed?’
But yesterday I watched him playing the Grand Inquisitor, interrogating
my friend Carlos Cruz-Diez, who seemed to be puzzled by Cavell’s motivation.
Danto’s paper ends: ‘(. . . ) There has been a recent attempt to deconstruct
philosophy by treating it as though it were art!’
Yes. Exactly so.
I suspect that Cavell and I would agree to disagree with Danto, that
philosophy is satisfactorily to be classified as an art among other art forms.
I have shown the group a 35mm slide taken from Monet’s Gare Saint-
Lazare (1877) to demonstrate that the ‘coloured patches’ which, following
the English philosopher Bernard Harrison, I was calling ‘homogeneous colour
presentations’, could be the objects of rational analysis and discussion.
This seems to have been well received, and I relax.
But why is Cavell now going on about coffee blenders and wine tasters?
The photograph makes this clear.
My rejoinder was intemperately expressed but, more importantly, it flies
in the face of much cherished ideologies regarding the sublime talent that
great artists are supposed to PERSONIFY.
A skilled rhetorician, Stanley Cavell has provoked an explosion of conflict-
ing Conceptualities.
What I actually said seems, in itself, to be harmless enough, although
obviously it requires qualification:
‘No! There is just one world and artists see it exactly the same way as
everybody else!’
Stephen Toulmin ruled that I had become overexcited, and that this state-
ment should be struck from the record.
But only now do I realise that, at that moment, I was identifying Stanley
Cavell with my old adversary José Ortega y Gasset who, in 1925, published
a text which, ever since I read it circa 1960, I have found to be objectionable
from every conceptual point of view:
From a sociological point of view the characteristic feature of the
new art is [. . . ] that it divides the public into two classes of those
who understand it and those who do not. This implies that one
group possesses an organ of comprehension denied to the other—
that they are two different varieties of the human species. (José
Ortega y Gasset).23
It was surely unfair of me to attribute Ortega’s position to Cavell, but I
am now in a position to schematise the questions that remain at stake:
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1.1 In what ways are an individual’s aesthetic responses socially accountable
and intelligible?
1.2 In what ways might these judgements be considered as ineffable?
2.1 Is there such a thing as ‘aesthetic competence’?
2.2 If so, is this a faculty innate in the individual?. . .
2.3 . . . or is it rather the object of a collective and organised educational pro-
cess?
Portsmouth, 25th June 2016
NOTES
1. See URLs.
2. See his website for publications and biog-
raphy (see URLs).
3. Beckett 1965, 291.
4. Descartes 1971, 3.
5. René Descartes, Discourse on Method II.
6. Herwitz 1993.
7. ‘Well, old, 70 years approximately,—the
coloring sensations that give the light, are
with me causes of abstraction (emphasis
added) that do not allow me to cover my
canvas, nor to follow the delimitation of
the objects when the points are kept, deli-
cate, from which it emerges that my image
or plane is incomplete.’ Translation: Rob
van Gerwen.
8. ‘The writer expresses himself with abstrac-
tions while the painter concretes (emphasis
added) by way of design and of the shape
his sensations, his perceptions.’ Transla-
tion: RvG.
9. From Conversations . . . ‘I owe you the
truth in painting and I will tell it to you’.
Translation: RvG.
10. Cf. Derrida 1978.
11. ‘Basically, Steele‘s work can be received at
two levels, visual and conceptual, where
both can penetrate each other.’ Transla-
tion: RvG.
12. ‘The difference that Max Imdahl posits
between “veritas aesthetica” and “veritas
logica”, Steele rejects.’
13. Bill 1968.
14. Piaget 1972, 79.
15. Wilde 2007.
16. Antagonismes was the title of an exhi-
bition organised by Julian Alvard at the
Musée des Arts Décoratifs in Paris, in
February 1960, which was decisive in my
development.
17. Arthur C. Danto, ‘The Philosophical Dis-
enfranchisement of Art’, a paper given at
the International Workshop on the Theory
of Art, held under the joint auspices of the
International Institute of Advanced Stud-
ies, Caracas, and the Museum of Modern
Art, J. R. Soto Foundation, Ciudad Boli-
var. Danto’s paper was read on a sunny
day in December 1984 in the hills over-
looking Caracas. The paper was developed
into his book of the same name.
18. Osborne 2013.
19. Cavell 1976, 181.
20. Sartre 1943, 82—90.
21. Friedrich Schiller, Über die ästhetische
Erziehung des Menschen, in einer Reihe
von Briefen, 1793.
22. Daniel Herwitz, op. cit., p. xiv, declares
that he takes his entire book to constitute
a ‘defence of Danto’s confident application
of his grand narrative.’ (p. 11).
23. Ortega y Gasset 1948.
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